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In 1955, Miss Elizabeth McClellan, an elderly resident of Bunker Hill, Los Angeles, 
handwrote a letter to her city councilman. Her rapidly increasing rent was untenable, she 
explained: “I find $24.00 is too high on an income of less than $40.00 per month.” She asked the 
councilman if there was a place in Los Angeles where she could live affordably and within 
walking distance of a church (McClellan, 1955). As she wrote, a bitter fight over Bunker Hill’s 
fate was underway. To resolve what they characterized as “blighted conditions conducive to 
[high] rates of disease, crime, and juvenile delinquency” (CRA, n.d.) the City was poised to evict 
the Hill’s 9,000 residents, demolish its buildings, and regrade the steep incline as part of a 
massive Urban Redevelopment Project. 
 Between roughly 1940-1970 pro-Renewal advocates defeated left-liberal bids for low-
rent subsidized housing and successfully promoted a plan for private redevelopment 
underwritten by public funds (Parson, 2005). The story of Bunker Hill concerns displacement of 
working-class residents like Ms. McClellan and redistribution of wealth from middle-class 
property owners and taxpayers citywide to downtown business elites, developers, and city 
agencies. But this story is somewhat more complex than the manufacture of profit. 
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 By exploring primary and secondary sources, an inquiry into Urban Redevelopment in 
Bunker Hill, Los Angeles facilitates a nuanced understanding of how political power is made and 
maintained. Nearly every U.S. city was transformed in the years following WWII by an 
expanding state, significant demographic change, and political economic flux. As the balance of 
power swayed, the state and society were pressed into reconfiguration. Such periods of change 
are occasioned by moral and ideological struggles that ultimately “influenc[e] the conception of 
the world of the masses” (Hall, 1996 [1989]: 419). Across city council hearings, newspaper 
broadsides, film and television, and personal and political relations, the extent and significance 
of “urban decline,” “blight,” “slums,” and “moral delinquency” was defined and contested. 
These struggles recast political formations and class solidarities in postwar Los Angeles, with 
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INTRODUCTION 
Bunker Hill, Los Angeles 
In 1955, Miss Elizabeth McClellan, an elderly resident of Bunker Hill, Los Angeles, 
handwrote a letter to her city councilman. Her rapidly increasing rent was untenable, she 
explained: “I find $24.00 is too high on an income of less than $40.00 per month” (McClellan, 
1955). She asked the councilman if there was a place in Los Angeles where she could live 
affordably and within walking distance of a church. At the time that she wrote, the largest Urban 
Redevelopment project in the US was slated for her neighborhood. McClellan and every other 
Bunker Hill resident would have to move elsewhere. Despite her increasingly unaffordable rent, 
McClellan and other elderly residents enjoyed the convenience of living near downtown. For the 
cost of a nickel, Bunker Hill residents took the short ride on Angels Flight, a small incline 
railway, to the center of downtown. Grand Central Market, directly across the street from the 
Angels Flight station, supplied fresh groceries. One could walk a few blocks to Pershing Square 
to sit in the sun or shade, chat with neighbors, or stroll around the park. And Los Angeles’s 
famous department stores were nearby. Bunker Hill residents, it seemed, had everything near at 
hand. 
In 1959, when evictions from Bunker Hill were imminent, another resident wrote to her 
councilman to express the desire to stay put. She relayed her and other residents’ frustration “at 
the idea of living any further from the immediate downtown than [we] now do, at possibly 
paying higher prices for the same groceries than [we] get at the Grand Central Market” (Starr, 
1959). Starr and her husband did not want to move.  
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This, despite the increasing disrepair of their apartment. She described to her councilman 
that the apartment’s flooring was warped, the linoleum on the bathroom and kitchen floors was 
cracked. There were worsening cracks in the walls and ceilings. When it rained, she wrote, “the 
downpour gets ‘in.’” With each rain, she explained, “the plaster would get sloppy-wet and later 
dry to crumble on the floor. […] In past weeks, a large chunk of plaster fell abruptly to the 
floor.” But this was home. She had lived there with her husband for “more years than we care to 
recall.”  
Bunker Hill’s residents did move, whether they wanted to or not. The dilapidated 
apartments were torn down. Rather than new housing for Bunker Hill’s longtime residents and 
other middle- and low-income downtown dwellers, luxury apartment buildings, hotels, and banks 
were constructed. 
Bunker Hill was a dense residential neighborhood on the western edge of downtown Los 
Angeles. It was seen as a problem by business and city officials since the early 1900s. The Hill 
was very steep, and its roads were very narrow. Early city maps listed the area as “Impassable 
For Teams” – the narrow, uneven, and dangerously steep roads were not safe for horse-drawn 
carriages (Adler, 1964). So, in 1901 the city decided to simply drill through the Hill to ease 
travel into and out of Downtown from the West. Two additional tunnels in 1924 made it possible 
for automobiles to avoid Bunker Hill entirely while traveling in or out of downtown. This solved 
a problem for commuters, but it also isolated the Hill from downtown and the West side, since 
one simply did not ever have to step foot on the Hill if she didn’t live there. 
At the end of the 19th century Bunker Hill was a swanky residential district – Los 
Angeles’s first suburb. Wealthy industrialists settled on Bunker Hill in the boom years following 
the Civil War. They built lavish Victorian mansions on the Hill, above the din and dirt of the 
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growing city. As the new century dawned and L.A. grew, Bunker Hill’s wealthy residents left for 
new suburban enclaves west of the city where they were definitively sheltered from Downtown’s 
bustling commerce and growing labor class (Adler, 1964). In the first two decades of the 20th 
century, Bunker Hill transitioned to a working-class neighborhood. The mansions were 
subdivided into apartments, and dozens of rooming houses and hotels were built (Dawson, 
2008). Workers arriving from the Midwest, Europe, and Mexico found affordable and centrally-
located housing on Bunker Hill. 
 Situated, as it was, so close to the central city, Bunker Hill’s dense, working-class make-
up was viewed as problematic for profitable downtown development. As early as 1929 a local 
developer proposed the total erasure of Bunker Hill using hydraulic mining equipment – the hill 
would simply be washed away. “Bunker Hill,” the developer proclaimed, “has been a barrier to 
progress in the business district of Los Angeles, preventing the natural expansion westward” 
(Qtd. in Adler, 1964: 29). The stock market crash of that year and the ensuing Depression put a 
damper on those grand designs. But his threats presaged Bunker Hill’s fate.  
 For several reasons, Bunker Hill came to be viewed as an out-of-place urban 
anachronism. The area was dense, most residents did not drive cars, and the buildings were 
relatively old. Los Angeles was supposed to be a city of sunshine, wide open space, and 
automobiles – a modern city. Bunker Hill’s residents were almost exclusively low-income and 
newly-arrived immigrants. According to the 1940 census, Bunker Hill’s population increased 
19% between 1930 and 1940 at the same time that rental space decreased. Twenty percent of the 
residents were foreign-born, predominantly Mexican immigrants. More than seventy-five percent 
of residents had less than eight years of schooling. And Bunker Hill’s housing was the oldest in 
the city, with the median date of construction 1895 (Adler, 1964). 
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In the late-1940s, Bunker Hill’s drab exterior and impoverished inhabitants became the 
backdrop for many brooding films noir. As Jim Dawson writes, directors chose Bunker Hill to 
frame their “troubling, starkly lit, almost documentary-style dramas about down-on-their-luck, 
hard-hit people in postwar urban America. None of the human characters were ever more 
desperate looking – or compelling – than the Bunker Hill locations themselves” (Dawson 2008: 
87). Bunker Hill’s on-screen fame ensured that many Angelenos regarded the neighborhood as a 
decrepit, dangerous place.  
A number of solutions were advanced for Bunker Hill, each one the subject of intense 
political controversy and struggle. Contemporary liberal reformers argued that Bunker Hill’s 
condition was symptomatic of systemic issues relating to aging infrastructure and economic 
inequality across the city. Reformers proposed large-scale planning that would “modernize” the 
city. Specifically, they envisioned a modern capitalist infrastructure that would facilitate growth 
– more specifically, infrastructure and property redevelopment that would raise land values and 
spur tax revenue (Alexander & Bryant, 1951). Ports and highways would provide for the 
transport of goods and people; a redeveloped downtown would reinvigorate commercial 
consumption and raise municipal tax revenue; and a large-scale housing program including low-
rent public housing near Downtown and other manufacturing districts would sustain Los 
Angeles’s laboring class. Liberal reformers proposed that Bunker Hill be completely 
redeveloped, its old structures removed and replaced with large, market-rate apartment houses. 
The current residents of Bunker Hill would be relocated to a low-rent public housing project just 
beyond the downtown area. 
Pro-redevelopment real estate elites (both within and without city agencies) broadly 
agreed with reformers’ vision of modern Los Angeles, but vigorously opposed public housing. 
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Representatives of prominent banks, insurance agencies, downtown department stores, real estate 
interests, the Los Angeles Times and other newspaper publishers agreed that updated 
infrastructure and a redeveloped downtown were necessary components of a modern capitalist 
Los Angeles. But the coalition – which held substantial investments in downtown real estate – 
organized an intense opposition to proposals in the early 1950s to construct thousands of public 
housing units near downtown. They viewed public housing as a direct threat to current and future 
real estate investments. Thus, they organized a successful lobbying campaign that equated public 
housing with communist threats to the American way of life (Parson, 2005). Downtown real 
estate interests organized instead a publicly-funded redevelopment project in which Bunker Hill 
was transferred to private real estate developers below market value, which was approved by 
City officials in March 1959 (Community Redevelopment Agency [CRA], 1970). Whereas 
liberal reformers had planned Bunker Hill as a middle-income apartment housing district, pro-
redevelopment elites advocated for luxury high-rise apartment housing, office space, up-market 
hotels, parking facilities, and a Civic Trade Plaza & Auditorium (Babcock, 1956). Pro-
redevelopment interests noted that redevelopment on Bunker Hill would spur growth for 
business and real estate in L.A.’s Central Business District (Babcock, 1956).  
Owners of property on Bunker Hill opposed both factions, insofar as redevelopment 
would force them to sell their lucrative rental units. Owners organized to oppose both public 
housing and redevelopment. Instead, they advocated a rehabilitation program, wherein Federal 
Housing Administration loans would be provided to owners who wished to rehabilitate their 
dilapidated properties or construct new ones (McInerny, et al.., n.d.). 
The Bunker Hill story demonstrates a major shift toward the commodification of housing. 
Liberal reformers viewed redevelopment as a tool to sustain the modern capitalist city through 
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housing, infrastructure, and commerce. Their grand plans for public and private housing would 
have institutionalized inequality and segregation by displacing low-income residents from the 
central city to a consolidated public housing project. Their plans, nevertheless, would have 
allowed thousands of low-income people to secure decent, stable, and affordable housing. 
Liberal reformers, furthermore, believed that housing was the basis for making a better world 
(Parson, 2005). Liberal planners and architects in Los Angeles experimented with the form of 
housing as part of their vision of social reform. In other words, liberal reformers rejected the 
commodification of shelter. Housing was valuable in its capacity as a social lynchpin, far beyond 
its capacity to generate profit. 
Pro-redevelopment real estate elites, on the other hand, accelerated the commodification 
of housing in Los Angeles. Elites were aligned with reformers’ plans to raise land values on 
Bunker Hill. Their vision of urban development also exacerbated inequality and segregation. 
But, whereas liberal reformers’ plans for public housing and other provisions would have 
ensured a measure of security for some low- and middle-income residents, real estate elites 
provided no such protections. Redevelopment on Bunker Hill displaced low-income residents 
from the central city and forced them to seek housing wherever they could find it. New housing 
developments on the Hill were, furthermore, luxury high-rises which would have been affordable 
only to L.A.’s wealthy residents. Real estate elites dispensed with reformers’ broader social 
goals. For them, real estate development was valuable only insofar as it produced return-on-
investment. They organized to gain control over the pattern of urban development. Through 
legislation, real estate elites transferred power from the federal and state to the local level. For 
local elites, the purpose of political struggle over redevelopment was to gentrify the central city 
and amplify real estate investment. 
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The Bunker Hill story also disrupts commonsense tropes regarding liberal and 
conservative political activities. It is often claimed that liberals want to grow the government, 
whereas conservatives seek smaller government. The historical evidence from postwar Los 
Angeles does not support this assertion. Local actors across the political spectrum - reformers, 
business elites, and property owners - each organized at the city, state, and federal levels. They 
leveraged federal and state housing legislation, and attempted (sometimes successfully) to 
introduce and reform welfare state laws in ways that would advance their specific political 
economic goals. In other words, both liberal and conservative factions built and tweaked the 
state’s capacity to build Bunker Hill in their image.  
In 1945, at the height of the housing crisis in Los Angeles, the California Redevelopment 
Law was created. Redevelopment was a significant turning point in the state’s approach to the 
housing question. With public housing, the state directly addressed the provision of housing for 
low-income people and exercised maximum control over the planning, construction, and 
management of these developments. Redevelopment, on the other hand, grew the responsibility 
of private entities with regard to housing provision and urban development. At the same time, 
while private entities were allowed to profit from redevelopment, public agencies shouldered a 
great deal of the costs for acquiring and preparing land in redevelopment areas. The shift from 
public housing provision to redevelopment was, broadly speaking, a shift from social service 
provision to subsidized profit. California, which established the first redevelopment agencies in 
the US, was the breeding ground for this political economic shift.  
The pages that follow are focused on the U.S. welfare state, especially the redevelopment 
provisions of the 1949 Housing Act. I disregard popular debates regarding so-called “deserving” 
or “undeserving” poor. Instead, I focus on structure. More specifically, I highlight how political 
8 
 
coalitions organized to build the welfare state for their own benefit. In the arguments that follow, 
I consider the following question with regard to welfare, redevelopment, and housing in postwar 
Los Angeles: Whose welfare was ensured by the state? I argue that federal, state, and local 
welfare legislation provided only minimum protections and opportunities for poor Americans. 
From its inception, the U.S. welfare state was concerned with sustaining capitalist growth, along 
with its corollary, inequality. Of course, liberal provisions such as roads, schools, parks, and 
public housing represented modest downward redistributions of wealth. But welfare state 
provisions have more often distributed wealth upward, into the hands of private real estate 
interests and suburban families, to name two examples.  
In my discussion of welfare state structure, I hope also to counter popular arguments 
regarding so-called “government incompetence,” or the “failure” of the welfare state. The 
historical evidence from postwar Los Angeles demonstrates that the welfare state was, in fact, in 
great working order. It succeeded in what it was designed to do, namely, the upward transfer of 
public and private wealth. Again, the contours of the U.S. welfare state were not shaped 
incidentally, but through deliberate and organized political struggle, the specifics of which are 
explored in some detail below. 
Bunker Hill in Context: Los Angeles, CA 1870-1970 
Bunker Hill emerged as a “problem” for political action as Los Angeles was undergoing 
wide-ranging political economic changes. By the end of the Second World War, L.A. had 
witnessed unprecedented transformations in demographics and economic development. Spurred 
by rapid growth, political groups of all stripes – workers, reformers, and various capitalist 
factions – organized fiercely to gain power. Bunker Hill was one arena, among many, where this 
struggle was waged.  
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In the immediate postwar, downtown Los Angeles was in decline. According to City 
officials, “blight” was rampant in the city. In particular, they pointed to substandard housing; 
falling tax revenue; rising social service costs; and health, fire, and moral hazards. Downtown 
business elites agreed. “We are disturbed over the blight conditions in our City,” stated one bank 
executive. These conditions, he added, “are sapping economic and tax-producing strength” 
throughout the downtown area (Braunschweiger, 1955). Amid fervent suburbanization, many felt 
Los Angeles was losing coherence. “The city has to have a center to it,” stated one department 
store owner, “you have to have a hub like a wheel. If you let the hub deteriorate, you haven’t got 
much to be suburban to” (Qtd. in Gottleib & Wolt, 1977: 307). Thus, business elites hoped to 
reassert downtown Los Angeles as the commercial and cultural center of the region. Beginning 
in the late 1940s, they organized themselves both within and without City agencies to redevelop 
downtown. This coalition sought to replace downtown’s aging housing stock – as well as its low-
income residents – with a music center, luxury housing, and corporate headquarters.  
 Bunker Hill, just west of the central business district, was identified early on as a primary 
focus for redevelopment. The area was long understood to impede the growth of downtown 
business interests. “Bunker Hill has been a barrier to progress in the business district of Los 
Angeles, preventing the natural expansion westward,” stated one developer in 1929, as part of a 
proposal to completely erase the Hill using hydraulic mining equipment (Adler, 1964). With 
steep, narrow roads, the area was mostly inaccessible to cars. To facilitate automobile travel, the 
city alternatively tunneled through and paved over Bunker Hill. Third Street tunnel in 1901, 
Broadway and Second Street tunnels in 1924, and the carving of the Harbor Freeway into Bunker 
Hill’s western edge in the late 1940s contributed to the area’s isolation and deterioration.  
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By the 1950s, city officials claimed the Hill was a hotbed of crime, disease, fire, and 
structural decay. Los Angeles Police Department’s Central Vice, in a report submitted to the City 
Council, stated, “this section […] has become the place of abode for pimps, prostitutes, narcotic 
peddlers, addicts and the too numerous to mention petty gamblers and thieves who ply their 
respective trades in the areas adjacent to the Bunker Hill district” (Carter, 1956). According to a 
survey conducted by the Health Department, a majority of residential structures in the area were 
either substandard or extremely substandard and needed to be demolished. (Health Department, 
1956). The City Planning Department stated Bunker Hill’s mixed use development and obsolete 
street pattern were depressing land values in the downtown area (Planning Department, 1956). 
An official from the Community Redevelopment Agency (the city bureaucracy responsible for 
organizing renewal projects) advocated for “the elimination of the health, fire, and police 
problems on Bunker Hill and the redevelopment of the area into a multiple-residence area 
providing housing adjacent to [downtown] and returning a high tax yield to the city” (Sesnon, 
1955). In the end, the City Council agreed that redevelopment was “urgently needed for the 
immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety” (Ordinance No. 104,408, n.d.). 
While pro-redevelopment interests emphasized social disorder and structural 
deterioration, they did not discuss wide-ranging shifts in political economy that were underway. 
Since 1870, Los Angeles’s historical geography had been shaped by expansions in population 
and urban development whose pace and intensity were unmatched by any other U.S. metropolis. 
Rapid economic development between 1900 and 1920 quadrupled the region’s population; 
between 1920 and 1940 the population doubled again. This massive influx laid the foundation 
for what would become the nation’s leading industrial metropolis (Scott & Soja, 1996). 
According to historian Eric Avila, industrialization of the regional economy during the second 
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quarter of the twentieth century drew to L.A. a labor force that was racially and ethnically 
diverse. These newcomers arrived as L.A.’s New Deal political culture coalesced around “public 
spaces such as factories, street fronts, streetcars, nightclubs, amusement parks, ethnic 
neighborhoods, community centers, and parks.” Thus, urban culture in LA during this period was 
characterized by what Avila describes as a “heterosociality of public life” that undermined 
Progressive era visions of a generation prior which sought “to create a racially and ethnically 
homogenous society” (Avila, 2004: 25-6).  
L.A.’s rapid demographic growth brought workers from across the U.S., southern and 
central Europe, Japan, and, especially, Mexico. “In 1920,” write geographers Allen J. Scott and 
Edward W. Soja, “Mexicans had become the largest immigrant group in Los Angeles.” Intense 
successions of migration centered on L.A “reinforced the character of Los Angeles as the most 
racially diverse – and racially segregated – of Pacific Coast cities” (1996: 6) The Depression 
years, especially, set L.A. apart. Unlike other U.S. cities, L.A.’s population and economy 
continued to grow in the 1930s. By the end of the decade, Avila writes, “Los Angeles County 
ranked first nationally in agricultural income, as well as in the production of airplanes and 
motion pictures, second in auto assembling and retail trade, fourth in women’s apparel, and fifth 
in the overall value of industrial production” (2004: 26). While L.A. cemented its status as a 
major manufacturing city, brutal class warfare and an open shop that lasted well into the 
twentieth century kept the region’s accelerating wealth out of the hands of L.A.’s working-class 
(Scott & Soja, 1996: 7).  
 Industrial and agricultural development centered on particular neighborhoods such as 
Watts, Boyle Heights, and El Monte, where workers forged political alliances across barriers of 
work, race, and ethnicity. Although L.A.’s labor movements were comparatively weaker than in 
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the large industrial cities of the East and Midwest, the 1930s nevertheless occasioned powerful 
labor organizing. At the height of the Great Depression – as joblessness, homelessness, and 
hunger became widespread – communists organized rural and urban workers to stage strikes and 
demonstrations. Radical and reformist political pressure mounted while California promoted 
piecemeal responses or looked the other way. In L.A., the Communist Party, historian John 
Laslett states, “was the first to tackle unemployment head on, […] and it was the only one to take 
the special plight of racial minorities into account” (2012: 113). Organizers established broad-
based networks across the city to protest evictions, unemployment, and the inadequacy of 
welfare (Laslett, 2012). During this period, Avila states, “Mexican American men and women 
struggled alongside blacks, Jews, and whites to improve the workplace conditions for 
longshoremen and cannery and defense workers, and to elect public officials who defended the 
interests of the city’s working class” (2004: 26). Grassroots struggle pushed the Democratic 
Party leftward – a move underlined by socialist Upton Sinclair’s nearly successful 1934 
gubernatorial campaign, End Poverty in California. Although Sinclair lost his bid, the New Deal 
coalition had gained significant ground in L.A. by 1936. “In 1930,” writes Laslett, “all of the 
city’s twenty-two state assembly were held by Republicans. But after 1936, the Democrats held 
sixteen assembly seats, whereas the Republicans held only six” (2012: 129). 
The nationwide postwar economic boom also fueled disproportionate growth in L.A. 
Between 1940 and 1970 the region’s population tripled - Los Angeles County grew from 2.8 
million to more than 7 million (Scott & Soja, 1996). During this period, housing, highways, and 
industry expanded in earnest beyond Los Angeles City. Helped along by segregationist federal 
housing policy, many whites of all classes migrated from the city center to suburban peripheries 
further and further afield (Avila, 2004). Changing job structure also exacerbated inequality. 
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African-Americans were pushed out of high-wage aerospace, electronics, and defense jobs by 
whites returning from the Second World War. While public and private money flowed to L.A.’s 
fledgling residential and industrial suburbs, Downtown and East L.A. suffered disinvestment. 
Thus, “extreme poverty” concentrated in L.A. where Black people had settled (Gilmore, 2007: 
39).  
In sum, as Los Angeles grew to new heights of industrial power, political economic 
conditions were organized to keep wealth out of reach for most workers – especially workers of 
color and immigrants. Housing policy was an essential tool in this regard. Political struggle 
surrounding the “problem” of Bunker Hill, which I explore in detail in Chapter 2 below, 
illustrated the ways that various factions proposed to shape and utilize federal and state housing 





Growth, Liberalism, and U.S. Welfare 
 In the following pages I discuss in some detail a number of local cases where U.S. 
welfare state policies – particularly as it related to housing – was implemented in ways that 
exacerbated inequality and residential segregation. I also broadly survey the history of the U.S. 
welfare state. 
When the United States entered the Great Depression, much of the nation’s housing was 
obsolete by government standards. Officials characterized the conditions in which millions of 
Americans lived as deleterious to health, safety, and morals (Bellush & Hausknect, 1967). 
Quality of life problems were compounded foreclosures. To alleviate the housing crisis, the 
federal government stepped in to an extent unprecedented in the nation’s history.  
Establishment of the Public Works Administration (1933) and Federal Housing Authority 
(1934) created powers to clear substandard housing and provide funds to homeowners and 
developers for repair and construction (Bellush & Hausknecht, 1967). Amid local opposition, 
large-scale clearance and low-cost public housing construction proceeded. While many poor 
urban dwellers did benefit from new construction, Bellush and Hausknect state, “the focus [was] 
not on dealing with the problems of urban dwellers as such, but on stimulating the economy” 
(1967: 8). In the absence of a simultaneous building program, the clearance of dilapidated 
housing actually exacerbated the housing shortage and raised rental prices. The provision of 
federal funding in the 1930s boosted a lagging economy; but the housing crisis remained acute.  
The 1949 Housing Act extended these shortcomings. In concession to public housing 
opponents, Title I of the Act created provisions for urban redevelopment. Under Title I, federal 
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money was provided to municipal housing authorities to plan and execute redevelopment 
projects. Cities purchased land in areas identified as “blighted” (i.e., dilapidated and in need of 
redevelopment) and sold it to private developers at a mark-down. “In other words,” Bellush and 
Hausknect explain, “Title I subsidized the purchase of prime land by private entrepreneurs, with 
the federal government paying the lion’s share of the subsidy” (1967: 12). Developers were free 
to construct luxury housing, low-rent private housing, commercial or industrial development, or 
other uses. As a result, swathes of aging, but low-cost housing was demolished, working-class 
residents were displaced, while commerce, industry, and middle-class housing took their place.   
Urban historians refer to this period of intense government involvement in urban 
development as “growth liberalism” (Hirsch, 1978; Miller, 2014; Self, 2005). In theory, growth 
liberalism was an optimistic attempt to fashion a more democratic and egalitarian city through 
large-scale planning. While growth liberals were optimistic reformers, they were still capitalists. 
Economic growth, especially property value and tax revenue increases, mattered a lot for growth 
liberals. In practice, liberal federal housing policy beginning in the 1930s worsened the national 
housing shortage and deepened inequality in at least three ways. First, as I mentioned above, 
“slum clearance” by the Public Works Administration demolished low-cost (though dilapidated) 
housing and replaced it with fewer units whose rents were unaffordable to poor urban dwellers. 
Second, in the absence of adequate relocation provisions, displaced residents were removed from 
centrally-located urban areas and relegated to crowded, deteriorated, and racially segregated 
residential areas. Third, suburbanization and urban redevelopment accumulated wealth in the 
hands of white property owners and business elites at the expense of working- and middle-class 
urban dwellers, especially African Americans and immigrants.  
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Federal, state, and local governments have consistently and extensively participated in 
the construction of racial geographies. In Managing Inequality: Northern Racial Liberalism in 
Interwar Detroit, Karen Miller shows how slum clearance and low-cost housing projects “upheld 
and formalized residential segregation in Detroit” (2014: 11). Through activism, African 
Americans won concessions from the New Deal state. They fought for political autonomy and 
unfettered access to the city’s resources, including housing, sidewalks, buses, and social service 
provisions (2014: 240). But, while white northern liberals promoted racial equality in rhetoric, 
they fashioned a state and city that “was neither politically nor economically redistributive” 
(2014: 13). Slum clearance displaced poor black residents who were not guaranteed relocation. 
Construction of segregated public housing formalized black Detroiters’ residential isolation.  
These strategies were reproduced by cities across the U.S. in the years following World 
War II. The ghetto of postwar Chicago, for example, Arnold Hirsch states, was “reinforced with 
tax payer’s dollars and shored up with the power of the state” (1978: 10). Again, residential 
segregation was the result of deliberate policies carried out by the state – urban redevelopment, 
suburbanization, and public housing policies, in particular. Although white racist terrorist 
violence in the first half of the century largely shaped Chicago’s South Side ghettos, the sheer 
numbers of southern African Americans who migrated to Chicago beginning in 1940 led blacks 
to settle in previously all-white neighborhoods (1978: 5). Subsidized by the Federal Housing 
Authority and Home Owner Loan Corporation, whites migrated to the suburbs. In their wake, 
block busting, housing shortage, and landlord speculation precipitated the physical decline of 
Chicago’s mostly-black South Side neighborhoods. Chicago’s city government, then, touted 
crowding and substandard residential conditions as reasons to demolish neighborhoods, move 
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residents to other segregated and deteriorated neighborhoods, and use the land for middle-class 
housing and institutional expansion (1978: 10).  
Postwar Oakland also witnessed wide-ranging “redistributions” of power, wealth, and 
people. “Jobs, investment, and taxable wealth left the city,” Robert Self states. “Redevelopment 
transferred property from residents to private developers. African Americans, displaced by urban 
renewal, moved into new neighborhoods. Tens of thousands of whites left for the suburbs, others 
remained in the city but moved away from their black neighbors” (2003: 138). The state gave 
particular shape to these redistributions. Segregationist housing policies provided means and 
incentives for whites to migrate to Oakland’s suburban periphery. Redevelopment in West 
Oakland displaced working-class residents (especially African Americans), dispossessed middle-
class property owners and small businesses, and enriched private developers. A more segregated 
and unequal city resulted from these dislocations. 
It is important to recognize the political economic factors that pushed and pulled people, 
capital, and government in tumultuous interwar and postwar years. The introduction to the 
Northern political economy of the automated assembly line, “and its counterpart, an aggressive 
Americanization program among workers by the beginning of the World War I, […] helped 
support the rhetoric of racial equality, since it assumed that individual workers should not be 
differentiated from each other based on their non-work-related identities” (Miller, 2014: 8). In 
other words, to facilitate economic growth both capitalists and state officials innovated political 
ideologies regarding “racial equality”. Analogously, administrators of Detroit’s slum clearance 
and low-income housing programs saw themselves as allies of African Americans; but “their 
vision meant the removal of the poorest black residents from the city’s downtown district, as 
well as the expansion and formalization of residential segregation” (Miller, 2014: 240).  The 
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language of “racial equality” was amplified as unequal class and racial hierarchies were 
simultaneously ushered in.  
United States cities were remade politically, economically, geographically, and racially in 
the years following World War II. The upheavals of this period included large-scale 
demographic redistribution within the U.S., state expansion at all levels, and political economic 
flux characterized, in part, by industrial restructuring, suburbanization, and urban redevelopment. 
These changes threatened the hegemony of many powerful elements. As whites left for the 
suburbs, downtown business elites and municipal governments suffered lagging property values 
and decreased business and tax revenues. “Powerful, but severely threatened,” business elites 
lobbied municipal powers to devise and implement redevelopment strategies (Hirsch, 1978: 
101).  In cities across the U.S. – including, as we shall see, Los Angeles – redevelopment was 
neither concerned with housing the city’s most vulnerable residents (the elderly, low-income, 
and war veterans), nor easing persistent housing shortages. Redevelopment was intended, on the 
one hand, to attract middle-class and wealthy consumers and, on the other, to enrich private 
interests situated downtown. 
The outcome of political struggle is never predetermined, however. As Hirsch states, “the 
postwar era provided, theoretically at least, an opportunity for dismantling, instead of expanding, 
the ghetto. […] Indeed, the real tragedy surrounding the emergence of the modern ghetto is not 
that it has been inherited but that it has been periodically renewed and strengthened” (Hirsch, 
1978: 5-6). Americans of every race, class, and region struggled to direct the form and meaning 
of growth liberalism. As Self shows, for example, African American Oaklanders “imagined the 
city and its possibilities, reacted to urban decline and decay, and fashioned politics and social 
movements with the ambition of making their neighborhoods and cities better places to live” 
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(2003: 13). The question, then, for scholars and activists is what constitutes the political power 
necessary to shape the urban environment? 
At present, business and real estate elites have largely succeeded in shaping national, 
state, and local housing and welfare state policies. One example of this success is the mortgage-
interest deduction for homeowners. Sociologist Matthew Davis’s profile of upper-income 
families showed how this works. 
Ohene Asare, founder of a technology consulting company, and Régine Jean-Charles, 
tenured professor at Boston College, lived with their four children in Milton, MA. They owned a 
beautiful, four-bedroom house worth $665,000 and earned a combined annual income of about 
$290,000, which put them in the top 5 percent of national household incomes in 2017. 
Sociologist Matthew David (2017) profiled Asare and Jean-Charles and many other families, to 
shed light on the kinds of structural support wealthy homeowners receive from the government. 
Asare and Jean-Charles were helped along by a tax break called the mortgage-interest deduction 
(MID) that allowed U.S. homeowners to deduct mortgage interest and other real estate costs such 
as property taxes. In 2015, the family claimed $21,686 in MID, which translated to a savings of 
$470 per month. For homeowners nationwide in 2015, the MID and other real estate tax breaks 
amounted to a $134 billion subsidy – greater than the combined budgets of the Departments of 
Education, Justice, and Energy that year. Desmond dubbed the MID and associated deductions, 
“a generous public housing program for the rich” (2017).    
 Crisaliz Diaz lived with her two sons in a two-bedroom apartment not far from Asare. 
She worked for HomeStart, a nonprofit focused on ending and preventing homelessness, where 
Asara served on the advisory board. Unlike Asare, however, Diaz earned $38,000 a year (putting 
her near the bottom third of American household incomes) and paid $1,385 each month in rent 
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alone (more than 40 percent of her paycheck). Diaz had virtually no savings and relied on credit 
cards each month to afford necessities like toilet paper and soap. Any unforeseen expenses 
would have placed her and her family at risk of eviction. Despite this, Desmond wrote, “Diaz 
receives no housing assistance.” He continued, 
The last time Boston accepted new applications for rental-assistance Section 8 vouchers was nine 
years ago, when for a few precious weeks you were allowed to place your name on a very long 
waiting list. Boston is not atypical in that way. In Los Angeles, the estimated wait time for a 
Section 8 voucher is 11 years. In Washington, the waiting list for housing vouchers is closed 
indefinitely, and over 40,000 people have applied for public housing alone (2017). 
Low-income renters like Diaz face the private rental market alone, where soaring costs claim 
more and more of their income.  
 A prevailing assumption, said Desmond, is that most low-income families receive some 
form of government assistance – such as public housing or Section 8 subsidies. The opposite, 
however, is true. He wrote, “nationwide, only one in four households that qualifies for rental 
assistance receives it.” In 2017, he continued, more than half of all poor U.S. families spent more 
than 50 percent of their income on housing, while one in four spent in excess of 70 percent 
(Desmond, 2017). A staggering number of working Americans who receive no housing 
assistance, simply transfer the majority of their income to landlords and utility companies.  
Real estate capitalists receive rental payments from their tenants in addition to generous 
federal and state subsidies. Journalist Alec MacGillis showed how this works (2017). He 
investigated rental properties in Baltimore, MD, where there is no public housing for a 
population of 825,000. MacGillis dubbed the roughly 20,000 tenants of rental properties he 
investigated “the modern precariat – […] casino workers, distribution-warehouse pickers, Uber 
drivers, students at for-profit colleges.” While some of these individuals received Section 8 
housing vouchers, most paid their own rent, ranging from about $800 to $1,300. High costs for 
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these Baltimore residents were greatly compounded, MacGillis wrote, by the landlord’s 
aggressive rent-collection practices. Tenants were slapped with excessive fees, and many were 
dragged through court to recover late payment. Management was also negligent with property 
maintenance, MacGillis wrote. Tenants reported broken appliances, pest infestations, holes in the 
walls, mold, leaks, and cracks which let in rain and snow. In these situations, residents paid 
exorbitantly for housing that may have harmed their health. 
Most tenants did not know, according to MacGillis, that their negligent landlord was 
Jared Kushner, President Donald Trump’s son-in-law and, until recently, chief executive of a 
sprawling real estate empire. Following the housing market collapse in 2007, Kushner 
Companies purchased tens of thousands of foreclosed middle-range rental units. In 2012, 
according to MacGillis, “a Kushner-led investment group bought 5,500 multifamily units in the 
Baltimore area with $371 million in financing from Freddie Mac, the government-backed 
mortgage lender.” Generous government lending, in other words, buoyed Kushner companies as 
it scooped up properties at foreclosure prices. 
These brief examples illustrate large-scale, government-sanctioned upward distributions 
of wealth. The accumulation of real estate by wealthy entrepreneurs is subsidized by generous 
federal loans. Homeowners with larger mortgages save more money each month on housing 
costs. Renters, on the other hand, face stagnant wages and find greater proportions of their 
income scraped into the hands of landlords and service providers. How and why do government 
subsidies flow so easily to wealthy homeowners and real estate capitalists, while low-income 
renters are largely left to fend for themselves?  
As we have seen, government subsidies are political economic tools intended to stimulate 
growth. Housing policy in the U.S. has historically been structured to push funds into the hands 
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of real estate interests and wealthy homeowners. The modern U.S. state, in other words, is 
principally concerned with the accumulation of wealth and the maintenance of inequality. The 
Bunker Hill story demonstrates the nuts-and-bolts of how local capitalist interests organized to 
shape housing policy for precisely this purpose. Before ratcheting down to the local level, 
however, it may be helpful to broadly review how the U.S. welfare state developed at the 
national level. 
The Emergence of U.S. Welfare 
The U.S. welfare state was organized to address problems associated with industrialization, 
urbanization, and rapid population growth at the beginning of the twentieth century. Mass 
migration to cities strained infrastructure and posed serious problems for U.S. city dwellers and 
governments. City and town governments stumbled over deepening crises of housing, 
transportation, sanitation, water-supply, healthcare, schooling, and poverty. Harms associated 
with these living conditions, such as disease and crime, boomed in densely populated working-
class residential areas. These soon spread beyond the “slums,” threatening all city dwellers 
(Garland, 2016). 
Economic crises of the 1890s and 1930s greatly compounded problems of urban inequality. 
Mass unemployment and runaway inflation were met by labor opposition. Workers organized to 
oppose their living and working conditions – some organized poor relief, others articulated anti-
capitalist alternatives to social and economic inequality. “The events of these years,” wrote 
sociologist David Garland, “shifted the balance of political power and the character of social 
relations, increasing the influence of trade unions and working people” (2016: 38). Thus, New 
Deal policies emerged as an answer to extreme inequality and political-economic instability. 
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Social welfare programs that present-day readers may take for granted took shape as a 
response to this political economic flux. Social insurance against income loss; income supports 
through food stamps, Earned Income Tax Credits, Medicaid, free school meals, and General 
Assistance; publicly-funded social services such as public schools, affordable housing, parks, 
and transportation; social services such as probation, social work, and child services; and 
government of the economy through tax laws, fiscal policy, minimum wages laws, etc. – these 
and many other measures were inaugurated with the U.S. welfare state. It is important to 
consider, Garland wrote, that welfare programs were aimed at preserving the status quo. “Social 
welfare,” he wrote, “was made to humanize capitalism – but also to make it more resistant to 
socialist challenge” (2016: 42). While welfare programs did – and continue to – alleviate 
suffering and provide opportunities for many poor people, the principal concern was, Garland 
continued, to “stimulate demand, keep money circulating, prompt investment, and sustain 
commerce” (2016: 42). 
Federal housing policy, which took shape in the wake of the Great Depression, is one part of 
this legacy. In 1929, the nation’s wealth soared to unprecedented levels. At the same time, about 
50 per cent of all U.S. families survived on minimum subsistence income. Over the next several 
years, following the economic collapse, hundreds of thousands of homeowners lost their property 
through foreclosures. Real estate construction stagnated while housing needs became 
increasingly dire (Bellush & Hausknecht, 1964). Thus, in the early 1930s, poverty and instability 
worsened for poor Americans and grasped many more.  
To stimulate growth, quell dissent, and alleviate the plight of some, the federal government 
greatly expanded its involvement in real estate. In 1933 the Roosevelt administration established 
the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC). The HOLC loaned billions to homeowners and 
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refinanced existing mortgages at lower interest rates and longer repayment periods. In other 
words, the HOLC redistributed wealth downward to homeowners, securing modest housing 
stability for many. Renters and other poor urban and rural dwellers, however, were not extended 
similar subsidies. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was established in 1934. The FHA 
insured new mortgages and loans for repair and construction with low interest rates and long 
repayment periods. FHA loans subsidized repair and construction undertaken by landlords, 
developers, and other real estate entrepreneurs. FHA-insured mortgages also shielded property 
owners from risk. If homeowners defaulted on mortgages, the government would cover the cost 
instead of banks or landlords. Through FHA and HOLC outlays, the federal government bailed 
out homeowners and shielded real estate entrepreneurs from risk.   
The Public Works Administration (PWA) (established 1933) and the United States Housing 
Authority (USHA) (established 1937 as part of that year’s Housing Act) created powers for cities 
to clear aging residential sections and construct low-rent public housing. In addition to providing 
shelter for urban poor, the PWA and USHA administered many publicly-funded social services 
such as public schools, libraries, parks, transportation, and other amenities. These amenities were 
distinct from public housing in that they were provided equally to all, not just low-income 
residents. For this reason, public works represented the most egalitarian aspects of the welfare 
state, akin to “social rights.” Public infrastructure was not, however, politically neutral. New 
Deal reformers designed, organized, and implemented “decommodified” amenities in ways that 
both alleviated and ensured inequality; stimulated economic growth; and opposed anti-capitalist 
organizing (Garland, 2016).  
Public housing and slum clearance represented modest downward redistribution of wealth 
that benefited many poor urban dwellers, but worsened the plight of others. More rental units 
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were demolished than created, thereby deepening the housing shortage; new units were generally 
too expensive for those who had occupied cleared housing; and public housing increased and 
institutionalized racial segregation in many cities (Gardland, 2016; Miller, 2014; Hirsch, 1989). 
By the end of the decade, public housing construction had largely tapered off, as the nation’s 
productive energies shifted to the war build-up (Bellush & Hausknecht, 1964). In general, 1930s 
federal housing policy was aimed at preserving the capitalist order by stimulating the economy; 
concern with the housing problems faced by poor urban and rural dwellers was largely ancillary.  
In its capacity as a reformist institution, the welfare state maintains a contradictory and 
extremely complicated relation to capitalism. “In welfare state societies,” Garland wrote, 
“privately-determined economic action and publicly-determined social protection are shackled 
together. The result is a contradictory hybrid in which each structure works to sustain but also to 
undermine the other” (2016: 52). Welfare programs buoy capitalism by providing a level of basic 
subsistence for some. They institutionalize inequality by distributing resources unevenly by race, 
class, gender, and geography. At the same time, however, they provide a measure of protection 
and opportunity to some. Welfare programs are meant simultaneously to stimulate growth, 
prevent radical organizing, and alleviate social and economic harms. For this reason, the 
meaning and extent of welfare programs are the object of intense struggle. Workers organize to 
force downward distributions of wealth through tax reform; minimum wage increases; legal 
protections; and the provision of social services like housing, transportation, General Assistance, 
and many other means. At the same time, capitalist factions organize (often at cross purposes) to 
build states and tweak policy for their own benefit. For example, as Desmond showed, the 
National Association of Realtors has lobbied for decades to preserve the MID: “a government 
subsidy that increases the prices of homes they build and sell” (Desmond, 2017). 
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 In the late 1940s, real estate interests successfully organized to increase federal outlays 
for private housing activities. In 1945, a representative of the National Association of Real Estate 
Boards asserted before the US Senate that the current housing shortage should be addressed 
through deregulation. The government should intervene in labor disputes and streamline the 
production of materials so that a large-scale private homebuilding program could progress 
uninhibited (Farr, n.d.). The role of the federal government, according to real estate interests, 
should be to clear the way for private construction; this, as opposed to federal, state, and local 
housing authorities building housing directly. The Housing Act of 1949 reflected this sentiment. 
“There [was] apparent in the law,” wrote Bellush and Hausknecht, “a not-too-subtle shift to 
concern with private enterprise rather than the very real housing need of the society” (1967: 13). 
The major responsibility for the provision of housing was placed with private real estate 
interests. As before, federal money was provided to clear aging residential districts; but after 
1949, the requirements for public housing construction were substantially decreased. The private 
real estate industry surely produced more market-rate housing as a result of these provisions. But 
the “slums” where poor people lived were demolished and redeveloped with few requirements to 
provide displaced residents with affordable replacement housing. Following the Housing Act of 
1954, this trend was increased. In addition to private housing and some public housing, federal 
funding was diverted to redevelopment for non-residential uses, such as civic and commercial 
expansions. 
 In 1937 public housing in the US advanced myriad purposes. The program was intended, 
in part, to provide decent shelter to poor urban dwellers; diffuse radical anti-capitalist demands; 
and stimulate the private construction industry, which was then, as now, an integral facet of the 
national economy. By the end of the following decade, however, with the Second World War 
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ended and the economic crises of the 1930s no longer directly threatening elites, real estate and 
other private interests organized to dismantle the modest redistributions of wealth instituted 
between 1932 and 1937. These political reorganizations were institutionalized, in part, by the 
Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954, which directed federal, state, and local resources toward the 
private housing industry and away from poor urban dwellers. Said differently, elites, through 
political struggle, built and reformed the state’s capacity to redistribute resources upward.  
The ramifications of this political struggle were observable surrounding the housing crisis in 





From Public Housing to Private Redevelopment 
 In postwar Los Angeles, housing was a serious problem. There was widespread lack of 
affordable housing for L.A.’s working class. As a result, workers were often crowded into 
dilapidated buildings, or wherever they could find shelter. Factions from across the political 
spectrum proposed solutions to this problem. But most solutions provided scant relief for ill-
housed Angelenos. 
 In the late 1940s and early 1950s, liberal reformers held powerful positions in L.A. 
Reformers proposed large-scale planning and redevelopment, including public housing 
construction for thousands of low-income families. In the early 1950s, however, an insurgent 
faction of real estate and other business interests organized to oppose public housing by equating 
it with Communism and Socialism. Elites successfully pushed for federal, state, and local 
legislation that prioritized private redevelopment over public housing construction. Los Angeles 
business interests were ultimately successful in their bid for power. In the immediate postwar, 
the city was a national leader in public housing provision. After a spectacular debate over public 
housing in the early 1950s, however, L.A. definitively ended its public housing campaign. As a 
result of their political organizing, local elites managed to restructure in significant ways the 
priorities of the federal, state, and local welfare state in order to subsidize real estate speculation 
and Central Business District gentrification.  
In 1945, at the height of the housing crisis in Los Angeles, the California Redevelopment 
Law was created. Redevelopment was a significant turning point in the state’s approach to the 
housing question. With public housing, the state directly addressed the provision of housing for 
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low-income people and exercised maximum control over the planning, construction, and 
management of these developments. Redevelopment, on the other hand, grew the responsibility 
of private entities with regard to housing provision and urban development. At the same time, 
while private entities were allowed to profit from redevelopment, public agencies shouldered a 
great deal of the costs for acquiring and preparing redevelopment areas. The shift from public 
housing provision to redevelopment was, broadly speaking, a shift from social service provision 
to subsidized profit. California, which established the first redevelopment agencies in the US, 
was the breeding ground for this political economic shift.  
Affordability, Growth Liberalism, and Public Housing 
 By 1945 the housing shortage in Los Angeles was acute. About 162,000 families, 
including 50,00 veterans, writes historian Donald Parson, “were living in tents, garages, trailers, 
and firetrap hotels. They were doubled- and tripled-up in existing houses, sleeping on boats in 
the harbor or in buses without tires” (Parson, 2005: 76). Returning veterans were given priority 
for public housing. But, in that year, not a single vacant public housing unit was available and 
the waiting list had grown to 6,000 families (Parson, 2005: 76). Those displaced by highway 
expansion therefore were left to fend for themselves in a fiercely competitive rental housing 
market. As a result, many thousands were prevented from securing decent or stable housing.  
 In a 1947 report prepared by the Los Angeles City Planning Commission, the California 
Housing Authority, and Mayor Fletcher Bowron’s Emergency Housing Committee, it was 
estimated that more than 250,000 additional housing units were needed by 1948. At the 
contemporary rate of homebuilding, the report went on to state, that number would not be 
reached for more than seven years – over which time the need would surely increase due to 
population growth, structural deterioration, and the clearance of housing units for highway 
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expansion. The Planning Commission doubted the ability of the private housing industry to 
adequately meet this need (Parson, 2005: 89).  
Charles L. Parr, a real estate entrepreneur and representative of the Apartment House 
Association of Los Angeles, during a public hearing on the matter, disputed the existence of a 
housing shortage. There was, by Parr’s estimate, a surplus of housing – enough to accommodate 
170,560 persons. Rent controls imposed by the Office of Price Administration, he asserted, were 
responsible for the “artificial” shortage (Qtd. in Parson, 2005: 67). Because rent controls 
minimized returns on real estate investment, he suggested, homebuilders were discouraged from 
undertaking new construction. Mr. Parr’s request for rental market deregulation may indeed have 
encouraged developers to ramp up housing construction. This, however, would have done little 
to address the housing shortage. Real estate speculation in the suburbs already exceeded demand 
(Dear, 1996). But L.A.’s working class, in the aggregate, found this housing to be out of reach. 
Contemporary economic studies showed average manufacturing earnings in L.A. were almost 30 
percent less than the minimum standard of living (Alexander & Bryant, 1951). Thus, at 
midcentury, the city’s poor and working class (disproportionately African Americans, Mexican 
Americans, and Asian Americans, but also many poor whites) had few opportunities for decent 
housing.  
L.A.’s “housing crisis” was not precisely a housing shortage; it was a crisis of 
affordability. There may indeed have been, as Parr asserted, a sufficient stock of housing to 
provide shelter to the estimated 162,000 persons unstably housed in 1945. But the “surplus” 
buildings identified by the Apartment House Association of Los Angeles had not been 
constructed for the purpose of providing shelter. They were intended, rather, to generate profit.  
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 City planners Robert Alexander and Drayton Bryant, in a 1951 publication entitled 
Rebuilding a City, elaborated this point. They were doubtful of the private housing industry’s 
ability to address L.A.’s housing crisis. Private homebuilding, they wrote, entailed “limited 
public purpose and even less public control” (9). For developers, housing was a commodity. 
“When private large-scale lenders invest money in housing,” Alexander and Bryant explained, 
“[it is] in order to earn a return on their capital.” This imperative to profit was inimical to 
affordability. “Inability to pay for decent housing,” the planners wrote, “is the basic economic 
fact which chains the great majority of families to slum areas … [where] not more than 10 to 20 
percent of the families can afford to rent or buy existing minimum housing elsewhere” (6).  
To fill the void left by the private housing industry, Alexander and Bryant proposed “a 
broad-scale economic, social, and physical planning program, one part of which is an integrated 
housing and redevelopment program” (5). In the absence of large-scale planning, speculation 
would continue unabated; low-income housing needs would continue to be unmet. Even if 
private developers chose to redevelop aging residential areas (which they rarely did, due to high 
cost of land downtown) new units would be wildly unaffordable for the low-income residents 
who lived in these areas. In Alexander and Bryant’s view, public housing was the only solution. 
Municipal housing authorities were prevented from speculating on real estate or garnering profit 
from housing and their activities were subject to public control. In other words, housing 
authorities treated housing as shelter rather than commodity. 
Public housing was seen as a necessary component of a city-wide redevelopment plan. 
Between 1940 and 1948 the Planning Department, in collaboration with the Health Department 
and nascent Community Redevelopment Agency, studied ten “blighted” areas - home to more 
than 93,000 people – for potential redevelopment (Alexander & Bryant, 1951: 20). If these areas 
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were redeveloped without a simultaneous expansion of the low-rent housing stock, displaced 
residents would likely be forced to move to areas where crowding and structural deterioration 
were equally poor or worse. Alexander and Bryant therefore advocated that less-dense areas 
should be given priority for redevelopment. Initial projects, the planners asserted, should host a 
mix of low-rent, medium-rent, and luxury housing, as well as commercial properties – thereby 
nurturing cross-class communities of mixed use. The availability of low-rent public housing in 
other areas that were less developed would also ensure that residents displaced from centrally-
located neighborhoods by successive redevelopment would have the option to relocate (Bryant & 
Alexander, 1951).  
For example, Bunker Hill, home to 13,882 people on ninety-eight acres in 1940, was the 
densest residential district in Los Angeles. A great many of the Hill’s residents were poor; many 
received income only from old-age pensions, disability payments, or low-paid or marginal work. 
The “problem of moving and rehousing” these individuals, Alexander and Bryant stated, “is the 
chief stumbling block to any redevelopment program for Bunker Hill” (45). Thus, the planners 
proposed Chavez Ravine should be redeveloped first, in order to provide relocation housing for 
Bunker Hill’s residents. “The Chavez Ravine area,” they wrote, “is the one central area which 
can be of major assistance in the eventual rebuilding of Bunker Hill. Since it is made up largely 
of vacant land [… it may] be the fulcrum on which to raise the entire long-term redevelopment 
program” (45). Alexander and architect Richard Neutra proposed the Elysian Park Heights 
project for Chavez Ravine. The complex would provide housing for 17,000 residents – 3,364 
units in twenty-four thirteen-story towers on a 278-acre site. In addition to housing, the project 
would contain three churches, three schools, kindergartens, nurseries, a Community Hall, a 
1,500-person auditorium, and a commercial center (Parson, 2005). This modern facility would 
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anchor the planner’s city-wide redevelopment vision by providing housing for the current 
residents of Chavez Ravine as well as those displaced from Bunker Hill and other proposed 
redevelopment sites. 
A brief aside is in order here. Alexander, Bryant, and other liberal planners in Los 
Angeles during the postwar years were interested primarily in growth. Humanitarian concern, 
though earnest and genuine, was subsidiary to liberal planners’ vision of a city nurtured by 
vigorous and sustained capitalism. In Rebuilding a City, Alexander and Bryant expressed at 
length their concerns over falling tax revenue. Property tax was the major source of local revenue 
for the city. But, they stated, the city faced a significant tax problem for two reasons. First, rising 
unemployment coupled with disinvestment in certain neighborhoods. Families faced mounting 
pressure as wages stagnated or disappeared and housing costs rose. Some secured housing in the 
area by doubling up with friends or relatives; others moved away. As a result, vacancies, 
foreclosures, tax delinquency, and a dwindling tax base reduced city revenues. Secondly, rising 
inflation caused the cost of municipal operations to increase (Alexander & Bryant, 1951). In 
short, costs rose out of proportion with revenue. “As a consequence,” Alexander and Bryant 
asserted, “the better areas of the city must produce not only enough revenue to pay for the 
services which they themselves receive, but must produce a large surplus to help carry the load 
of the tax-deficient areas. The owners of the average and better-than-average properties are thus 
subsidizing the owners of the tax-deficient property” (1). The problem of falling tax revenues 
was, the planners stated plainly, “the principal economic justification for rebuilding uneconomic 




In addition to new, modern, and economically productive buildings, planners hoped that 
redevelopment would encourage wealthy Angelenos to live and consume in redeveloped areas. 
Suburbanization had substantially undercut downtown commercial activity. High-end commerce 
had relocated, along with wealthy residents, to outlying districts. “Many stores which once 
featured high-priced, high quality goods,” the planners lamented, “now carry cheaper 
merchandise to attract the trade of the low-income groups in the surrounding blighted and near-
blighted areas.” Swaths of dilapidated housing would be removed, according to Alexander and 
Bryant’s plan, and replaced with “governmental, commercial, or light industrial areas [… as well 
as] livable, residential neighborhoods that would attract families in the middle, and even some in 
the upper, income groups” (2). While contemporary planning emphasized highways as the 
solution to this problem – allowing wealthy residents to travel by car from suburbs to the 
traditional downtown commercial district – Alexander and Bryant believed that commerce could 
best be sustained if wealthy residents actually lived in the vicinity.  
Despite this, proposals advanced by liberal planners did represented modest redistribution 
of resources to poor urban dwellers – most clearly through the provision of public housing. 
Thousands of low-income families in Los Angeles were able to secure inexpensive, stable, and 
decent housing as a result of public housing construction. Public housing in Los Angeles was 
racially integrated and served as a platform for working-class solidarity. The modest security and 
communality provided by public housing allowed workers to build and renovate broad political 
capacities. “Within the public housing projects,” writes Parson about postwar public housing in 
Los Angeles, “political expression emerged from the communal experiences of tenants as they 
organized around issues of self-management, shared housework, day care, opposition to racism, 
and confrontation of hostile real estate interests” (Parson, 2005: 69). Grassroots organizing was 
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channeled upward, shaping political organizing on a national scale. The AFL, for example, 
called for the construction of 500,000 units of housing per year in combination with a nationwide 
slum-clearance program. The CIO, likewise, advocated for the construction of 1.5 million 
housing units (at least 500,000 publicly owned) over twenty years (Parson, 2005). 
In the immediate postwar, Los Angeles was a national leader of public housing provision. 
In 1945, 53,469 Angelenos lived in 12,275 units of public housing (Parson, 2005). In 1949 the 
City of Los Angeles, with unanimous support from the city council, contracted with the federal 
government to construct 10,000 additional public housing units (Parson, 2005). L.A., according 
to the City Housing Authority, was on its way to becoming “the nation’s first city free of bad 
housing” (Qtd. in Parson, 2005: 76). But this goal was to be cut short.  
From Public Housing to Private Redevelopment 
In 1952 and 1953, a well-organized coalition of real estate interests organized a fierce 
red-baiting campaign in opposition to the 10,000 proposed units of public housing. With 
publishing support from the Los Angeles Times, which had substantial real estate investment in 
the downtown area, real estate interests widely distributed pamphlets which dubbed Mayor 
Bowron’s City Housing Authority the “GESTAPO HOUSING AUTHORITY” (Qtd. in Gottleib 
& Wolt, 1977: 260). Local real estate entrepreneur Fritz Burns, founder of Committee Against 
Socialist Housing (CASH), bought billboards across the city that warned, “Don’t pay somebody 
else’s rent!” CASH printed ads in the Times and other sympathetic papers with headlines such as, 
“CRIME In Public Housing!”  (Qtd. in Parson, 2005: 76). Local real estate interests took to the 
streets, public hearings, and news media to push the notion that public housing was a dangerous, 
communistic institution that posed a threat to Americans’ way of life. 
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In January 1952, amidst mounting political pressure, the Los Angeles City Council 
unanimously agreed to submit the public housing contract to a city-wide vote. The Council did 
not have the authority to rescind the approval of the City Housing Authority’s contract with the 
federal government. And if the contract was broken, Los Angeles would owe the federal 
government over $13 million. The Council, however, apparently felt that public sentiment 
against public housing had grown enough since 1949 that their support of public housing 
construction may undermine their chances for reelection. In June 1952, the majority of voters 
chose to cancel the public housing contract.  
Due largely to his support of public housing, Mayor Bowron lost his 1953 reelection bid 
to conservative businessman Norris Poulson. After taking office, Poulson, in defiance of a 
California Supreme Court ruling that stated Los Angeles must carry out the FHA contract, 
pushed through an Ordinance that officials ended the city’s adherence to the 1949 Housing 
Contract. Only about 4,000 new units were constructed instead of the planned 10,000. And these 
scant units were the last to be constructed in Los Angeles up to present day. 
 To better understand what I mean by pro-redevelopment real estate elites it may be 
helpful to observe the Downtown Business Men’s Association (DBMA). A powerful pro-
redevelopment advocate, the DBMA represented over 250 downtown businesses – principally, 
bankers, insurance and energy corporations, prominent newspapers, and department stores 
(Downtown Busines Men’s Association, 1959). During one public hearing, Walter J. 
Braunschwiger (President, DBMA and Executive Vice President, Bank of America) promoted 
the Bunker Hill Redevelopment Project as “important to the future growth and continuing well-
being of the Los Angeles metropolitan area as an active, convenient, functional, attractive, and 
healthy [city].” A thriving and profitable downtown, according to Braunschwiger, was essential 
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to L.A.’s growth and well-being. He added that the central business district generated tax 
revenue and retail sales far in excess of its size relative to the total area of the City. But, he 
complained, “blight” was “sapping economic and tax-producing strength” (Braunschwiger, 
1955). In the opinion of the DBMA, redevelopment would correct “blight” insofar as it would 
invigorate downtown’s tax base and make it an attractive and accessible area for middle-class 
consumers to reside. 
Downtown department stores, perhaps even more so than banking, insurance, and energy 
corporations, staked their future on downtown redevelopment. Since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, department stores had enormous influence over L.A. politics, culture, and 
urban development. As Richard Longstreth writes, “No other kind of business activity and no 
infrastructural project appears to have matched the impact of [department stores] in setting the 
main paths and parameters of downtown [L.A.] into the mid-twentieth century” (1997: 24). 
L.A.’s pattern of development in the first two decades of the century largely coalesced around 
department stores. This meant, in other words, that department stores had enormous investments 
at stake in the continued prosperity of downtown L.A. 
How, specifically, did investment on the part of department store owners shape 
downtown? In short, during the first decades of the twentieth century the development of L.A.’s 
urban core was directly tied to department store expansion – more so, even, than public 
infrastructural development. Flagship construction was combined with real estate speculation on 
undeveloped land adjacent to the nineteenth century urban core. This practice secured profits as 
well as cultural, economic, and political supremacy for several reasons. Owners acquired cheaper 
land and won greater profits through speculation than retail alone. And, to undercut competitors 
located on congested downtown streets, new flagships were built along outlying roads – 
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providing easy access from middle- and upper-class residential tracts. Thus, between 1900 and 
1920, the commercial center of L.A. expanded horizontally, drifting several blocks south and 
west. Central business district expansion was hampered by Bunker Hill on the west side, 
however, and new areas soon became as congested as the old (Longstreth, 1997). 
Bullock’s department store is one example of this. Its flagship, constructed 1906-1907, 
was sited a few blocks south of the commercial center. Over the next ten years, Bullock’s 
expanded its floor area to nearly 460,000 square feet by constructing a new skyscraper and 
purchasing several adjacent buildings (Longstreth, 1997). Congestion soon followed, however. 
And, as Angelenos’ early love affair with automobiles grew in the late 1920s, retail expansion 
progressed to areas well beyond downtown to provide convenient access to middle- and upper-
class consumers. Bullock’s, for its part, opened a branch in 1929 on Wilshire Boulevard, 
complete with valet parking (Longstreth, 1997). 
The imperative to seek new markets further and further afield contributed to the decline 
of the central business district. This was evident by 1930, when a major tourist guide observed 
downtown was “experiencing serious competition from the sections developing along main 
arteries and in the suburbs of the greater city” (Federal Writers Project, 2011: 145). Between 
1930 and 1950 construction downtown was at a standstill. Major property owners, led by the 
DBMA and major department store owners, attempted remodeling. When this failed to stimulate 
growth, however, they changed course.  
In contemporary Chicago, which witnessed analogous development, “powerful but 
severely threatened” downtown business leaders harnessed expanded state power to implement 
downtown redevelopment (Hirsch, 1978). This proved to be the case in Los Angeles, as well. 
P.G. Winnett, Chairman of Bullock’s was a major ally of the CRA during the 1950s. During one 
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Council Public Hearing, he spoke in support of the CRA’s plan, stating that redevelopment 
would “stabilize” property values, which had been stagnant or falling in recent years (City Clerk, 
1956). B.O. Miller, president of Great Los Angeles Plans, Incorporated (another business 
association whose membership largely overlapped with the DBMA) insisted downtown must be 
improved to increase tax revenue. The CRA’s plan, he added, would be completed without cost 
to taxpayers (City Clerk, 1956).  
Between 1954 and 1959, downtown business elites aggressively lobbied councilmembers 
to support the total redevelopment of Bunker Hill. They accepted the characterizations of blight 
on Bunker Hill advanced by the CRA and allied city agencies. By replacing low-cost single room 
occupancy housing with high rise luxury apartments, by replacing low-income and working-class 
residents with upper-class consumers, the downtown commercial district would, on the one hand, 
benefit from an influx of well-to-do shoppers, and, on the other, be relieved of burdensome tax 
rates. 
In 1945, at the height of the housing crisis in Los Angeles, the California Redevelopment 
Law was created. Redevelopment was a significant turning point in the state’s approach to the 
housing question. With public housing, the state directly addressed the provision of housing for 
low-income people and exercised maximum control over the planning, construction, and 
management of these developments. Redevelopment, on the other hand, grew the responsibility 
of private entities with regard to housing provision and urban development. At the same time, 
while private entities were allowed to profit from redevelopment, public agencies shouldered a 
great deal of the costs for acquiring and preparing redevelopment areas. The shift from public 
housing provision to redevelopment was, broadly speaking, a shift from social service provision 
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to subsidized profit. California, which established the first redevelopment agencies in the US, 
was the breeding ground for this political economic shift.  
According to California Redevelopment Law (CRL) redevelopment agencies, responsible 
for organizing redevelopment projects, could be established at the local level. Redevelopment 
agencies were empowered to acquire, sell, and develop land; finance its own operations by 
borrowing public money and selling bonds; impose land use and development controls; and the 
obligation to relocate persons by redevelopment. The ideological and structural arrangements of 
redevelopment policies traced to President Hoover’s 1932 Conference on Home Building and 
Home Ownership, which proposed large-scale, centralized “district replanning” at the local level. 
In the early 1940s, the Federal Housing Authority and Urban Land Instituted advocated for 
replanning and redevelopment to be carried out by state-enabled local redevelopment 
commissions that would use federal funds to acquire land in dilapidated districts and sell or lease 
it to private developers (Marks, 2004). In California, redevelopment was seen as a means to 
entice private investment in “blighted” districts by offering initial public funding. 
Redevelopment agencies typically borrowed money, through the issuance of bonds, in order to 
offer this initial funding to developers. 
Bunker Hill was the densest neighborhood in Los Angeles. According to a 1957 study by 
the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety, 60% of the area’s 362 properties were 
“dangerous” and required demolition (Department of Building and Safety, 1957). Before the 
powers of redevelopment were created, developers would have to purchase individual properties, 
demolish those structures designated as officially “dangerous,” and then build new structures. 
This process, according to contemporary real estate advocates, was too expensive and arduous. 
Planners and other city officials argued this incremental process was not sufficient to eliminate 
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blight in large areas. Redevelopment was advanced as the solution. The CRA bought all 362 
properties on Bunker Hill, demolished them, regraded the hill, constructed new streets and other 
necessary infrastructure, and divided the land into ready-to-develop properties. This preparatory 
development was funded by federal grants and bonds issued by the CRA. The prepared 
properties were sold to developers at costs below what the CRA had initially paid.  
 The Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA), created under Mayor Fletcher Bowron 
in 1948, was the public bureaucracy that organized Bunker Hill’s redevelopment. City planners 
in the 1940s believed private development alone could not work on a scale large enough to 
provide adequate housing and correct urban decay. Thus, they pushed for state legislation that 
would institutionalize the power to condemn, clear, and redevelop land (Marks, 2004). The 
California Redevelopment Law of 1945 made it possible to create local redevelopment agencies 
with authority to acquire, sell, and develop land; finance its own operations by borrowing public 
money and selling bonds; impose land use and development controls; and the obligation to 
relocate persons displaced by redevelopment (Marks, 2004).  
As with contemporary federal housing policy, the California Redevelopment Law of 
1945 reflected conflicting efforts of advocates for low-income housing and business and real 
estate interests who sought to rejuvenate lagging commercial districts (Marks, 2004). This 
tension shaped the resulting pattern of urban growth and development. In L.A., as elsewhere, city 
officials, business and real estate elites successfully organized redevelopment to increase tax 
revenue, raise land values, and facilitate middle- and upper-class consumption in downtown 
commercial districts. Urban Redevelopment policy between 1940 and 1960, state David Madden 
and Peter Marcuse, “was seen by its proponents as a means of strengthening downtown and 
eliminating the sight of urban decay nearby. Supporters were not concerned with aiding those 
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who were poorly housed but with tearing down areas they considered to be slums – at least those 
located near major business centers.” (2016: 131). L.A. City Planners advanced the construction 
of low-income housing as justification for the Redevelopment Law (Marks, 2004); but, the 
resulting redevelopment projects did not resolve the housing shortage or improve the quality of 
life for poor residents of downtown. Although the CRA would over the next sixty years finance 
the construction or rehabilitation of more than 28,000 units of low-cost housing, the vast 
majority of these were sited outside of the central business district (Marks, 2004). In other words, 
the intent of redevelopment was to secure Downtown L.A. for commercial and luxury housing 
development, while evacuating thousands of low-income residents.  
The CRA’s Board of Commissioners – appointed by Mayor Bowron – was dominated by 
downtown business and real estate elites. Under their administration, the CRA explicitly and 
repeatedly stated that federal, state, and city Urban Redevelopment outlays would be used to 
construct luxury housing and institutional headquarters, thereby raising Bunker Hill and adjacent 
property values. CRA Chairman and oil and real estate heir William Sesnon emphasized that 
Bunker Hill’s annual tax revenue would increase more than six fold following redevelopment 
(Sesnon, 1955b). “The purpose here,” he stated, “is to use the Community Redevelopment 
Agency’s power of eminent domain to clear out slum and sub-standard housing conditions, and 
restore the land to its highest use in keeping with its location in the heart of a thriving 
metropolis” (Sesnon, 1955c). Bunker Hill’s land use was more than just out-of-place; in the eyes 
of CRA and other pro-redevelopment officials, the Hill undermined profitable developments in 
the area. “This decaying area threatens both the expanding Civic Center and downtown business 
district,” stated one CRA pamphlet (CRA, n.d.). The Agency and city social service agencies 
pointed to the presence of alcoholics, high rates of tuberculosis, fire hazards, crowded and 
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substandard housing to argue that Bunker Hill was a decrepit anachronism in the heart of a 
modernizing city. Quite explicitly, the Hill was viewed as a cancer whose spread could only be 
prevented through removal.  
What would the appropriate land use for Bunker Hill be, according to the CRA? Over 
radio waves, newspaper broadsides, and in public hearings between 1954 and 1956, the Agency 
promoted their answer to this question. Sesnon summed up the CRA’s goals in a presentation to 
Mayor Poulson, city agencies, and members of the City Council in 1956: 
In launching this program, we propose to eliminate a number of extremely sub-standard and poor 
rooming houses and hotel units which constitute a menace to health and lives. We seek to clear 
blighted conditions which have raised disease, crime, and juvenile delinquency rates above the 
community average. We seek the demolition of wooden frame structures, as much as eight stories 
high, which constitute a serious fire hazard (Sesnon, 1956). 
Where “blighted conditions” then prevailed, Sesnon explained, the CRA would erect “modern, 
privately-owned and operated buildings … All this, I might add, on the basis of our own free 
enterprise system” (Sesnon, 1954).  
The CRA’s Bunker Hill plan featured residential, commercial, and “civic-trade” uses. 
This included apartments, shopping centers, parking, office buildings, a “major hotel”, and, 
tentatively, a civic auditorium including “convention and trade show exhibition areas and a 
music center.” (CRA, n.d.). The Hill’s new residents, according to the CRA, would be office 
workers and civic employees. In addition, several thousand tourists and out-of-town businessmen 
would find luxury accommodations in a large new hotel. The entire area, stated the CRA in a 
press release, would have “an almost park-like appearance” (CRA, n.d.); Bunker Hill residents, 
office workers, and visitors could luxuriate in plazas and planted gardens during lunch breaks, 
weekends, or visits.  
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 Before the gleaming new buildings could be erected, or the landscaped plazas planted, 
the CRA would “prepare” the land. The Agency would buy or condemn property; demolish all 
existing structures; completely regrade the Hill (reducing its elevation by more than 100 feet in 
places); construct utilities; and adjust the street pattern (CRA, 1970). The plan was, in short, a 
massive infrastructural project to completely refiguring the area. The erasure of Bunker Hill’s 
landscape - the removal of people, earth, brick, wood, concrete, and glass – would, according to 
the CRA’s rationale, erase social and economic problems characterized as “blight,” “disease,” 
and “crime.”  
By exercising maximum control over Bunker Hill’s land use, the CRA hoped that Bunker 
Hill’s transformation would improve the surrounding area as well. The Agency, in collaboration 
with city Planning officials, would rezone the area (CRA, 1970). Nearly 20,000 parking spaces 
would also be created, to facilitate access to the civic center and downtown area for middle- and 
upper-class white suburban commuters. Pedestrian and automobile traffic would be integrated to 
facilitate “convenient pedestrian circulation, … higher land usage,” and the efficient flow of 
traffic between the Harbor Freeway to the west and downtown streets to the east (CRA, 1970). 
The CRA was required by law to relocate displaced residents. Sesnon insisted the CRA 
would find housing for displaced people “in approximately the same price range” as that 
available on Bunker Hill (Sesnon, 1954). But he pointed to a similar redevelopment project in 
New York City where only seven percent of displaced residents “needed help in getting 
reestablished in new dwellings” (Sesnon, 1954). And, indeed, when it came time for the CRA to 
set aside funds for relocation the budgeted for only seven percent of the Hill’s population. 
Nevertheless, he claimed redevelopment would “relieve” the Hill’s elderly residents of their poor 
housing conditions and relocate them in “new, better designed, and more fitting housing” 
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(Sesnon, 1955). Whereas “modern, clean and attractive” homes were proposed for 20,000 people 
on Bunker Hill, it was unclear if these would be made available to the area’s elderly and other 
residents.  
 How would the CRA finance the Bunker Hill project? And, more importantly, how 
would they sidestep accusations of “Socialism” or “Communism” which had undermined the 
recent proposals for public housing construction? On this, the CRA was adamant: “NO COST 
TO TAXPAYERS,” they proclaimed in one fact sheet delivered to the City Council (CRA, n.d.). 
The project costs were explained in a press release following City Council approval of the 
CRA’s Redevelopment Plan in 1956. It was estimated that about $40 million would be required 
to purchase all the properties on the Hill, clear the land, regrade the hill, construct utilities, and 
realign streets (CRA, 1970). Two thirds of this amount would be provided by federal funds, 
through both grants and loans. Federal loans, CRA officials stated, would be “repaid in part by 
the ultimate sale of the land to private developers” (CRA, 1970). Since land would be sold to 
developers for less than the city paid to acquire it, there would be a difference remaining. The 
CRA would assume the remaining third of the project cost, estimated at about 7 million. “The 
local one-third share of the Net Project Cost,” stated the CRA Redevelopment Plan, “is to be 
provided by the sale of Agency tax allocation bonds” (CRA, 1970). In other words, property 
taxes derived from Bunker Hill following its redevelopment would be put directly toward debt 
servicing. Tax allocation bonds, also known as tax increment bonds, would be used to foot the 
Agency’s $7 million bill and to repay federal loans and interest in excess of that covered by the 
sale of land to developers. The final cost to the CRA, according to its Redevelopment Plan, 
would be “in the neighborhood of $15,000,000” (CRA, 1970). The use of tax increment 
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financing, however, allowed Agency officials to suggest that the project paid for itself, thus 
posing “no cost to taxpayers.” 
 What is tax increment financing? In short, tax increment financing captures property tax 
revenue which is then used to service debt and/or finance further redevelopment. Property tax, 
like any tax, is allocated directly to the taxing authority (in this case, the City of Los Angeles); it 
is, thus, public money dispensed by the municipality for public purposes. According to tax 
increment financing, however, after Bunker Hill was redeveloped the City continued to receive 
the same tax revenue as that generated prior to redevelopment. Any increase in property taxes 
beyond this amount as a result of redevelopment and subsequent increases in land value, 
however, was be siphoned directly to the CRA. This mechanism was innovated by the CRA in 
1951 following the electoral defeat of a general obligation bond issue that would have financed 
Bunker Hill and other redevelopment projects. CRA historian Mara Marks has noted that tax 
increment financing granted the Agency financial autonomy. It was also intended to ease reliance 
on federal funding, which was seen by local business leaders as “a threat to business influence 
over local affairs” (Marks, 2004: 258-9). 
 As Marks stated, the CRA was created as “an important counter weight to the postwar 
magnetic pull of new suburbs for business and investment” (241). The effect of this 
counterweight works on many levels. Most obviously, in the case of Bunker Hill, the CRA 
organized a large-scale infrastructural project that, in effect, focused the dispensation of public 
money in one area of the city. Secondly, since developers were allowed to purchase property on 
Bunker Hill at a discount, the transfer of wealth to private hands was underwritten by public 
debt. Additionally, although the CRA claimed redevelopment would increase tax revenue and 
thereby benefit “home owners and inhabitants of all other parts of the metropolitan area” (CRA, 
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n.d.). As we have just seen, this is only partially true - tax increment financing ensured that 
elevated tax revenue from Bunker Hill and other redevelopment projects would be transferred to 
the CRA rather than the city at large. The problems with TIF are as follows: Money that would 
otherwise go into city coffers and (ideally) be used equally throughout the city instead is 
concentrated in a single area or neighborhood. TIF obscures costs. Yes, the public isn’t paying 
for redevelopment directly, but those communities outside of the redevelopment area are 
prevented from receiving tax dollars that would otherwise be available to them. The public may 
organize to demand the city pay a more equitable social wage. The CRA, however, is more or 
less protected from this demand – they aren’t the government, they are only responsible for 
redevelopment projects. 
Conclusion 
The Bunker Hill story traces the welfare state’s expanded role in the commodification of 
housing. Redevelopment was a significant turning point in the state’s approach to the housing 
question. With public housing, the state directly addressed the provision of housing for low-
income people and exercised maximum control over the planning, construction, and management 
of these developments. Redevelopment, on the other hand, grew the responsibility of private 
entities with regard to housing provision and urban development. At the same time, while private 
entities were allowed to profit from redevelopment, public agencies shouldered a great deal of 
the costs for acquiring and preparing land in redevelopment areas. The shift from public housing 
provision to redevelopment was, broadly speaking, a shift from social service provision to 
subsidized profit. California, which established the first redevelopment agencies in the US, was 
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